This paper analyses the adoption of EU conditions regarding non-discrimination and minority protection in three applicant countries: Romania, Hungary and Poland. While non-discrimination is a well established EU norm, minority rights are a contested norm and not enshrined in the acquis communautaire. It is argued that contestation over norm meaning highlights the importance of norm resonance and domestic norm construction in processes of norm diffusion, and that the conceptual tension between the internal and external EU policy towards minorities implies the possibility of unintended long-term effects in the applicant countries, as well as potential backlash against the EU after accession.
values of the European Union's internal development and for the purpose of its enlargement, whereas minority protection is only mentioned in the latter context.' 10 By scrutinising minority protection as a contested norm in the EU enlargement process, this paper means to contribute to research on the development of international norms. It contests the assumption that international norms have to be 'robust' in order to have impact and therefore can be treated as stable structural factors with fixed and clear meaning. To that extent, it problematises the meaning of particular norm types. To demonstrate the variation of meanings of specific norms types, we first trace different interpretations and path dependent developments based on the reconstruction of meaning of regional and global norms. Secondly, we seek to identify the role of different domestic meanings of norms in the course of rule-adoption by applicant states. We argue that although EU conditionality may induce compliance, the contestability of minority rights implies the possibility of unintended long-term effects in the applicant countries, as well as potential backlash against the EU after accession.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in four parts. In the first part, we situate the subject within the recent international relations literature on norms, developing the theoretical argument of path dependent norm construction and norm resonance. In the second part, we establish the content of the norms of non-discrimination and special minority rights in the international and European context, and elaborate on their internal institutionalisation and external promotion by the EU, with a special focus on the conceptual tensions between the articulation of minority protection norms in these different contexts. In part three, we offer a comparative account of the norm diffusion and domestic norm construction in the case of three applicant countries: Romania, Hungary and Poland. Finally, the conclusion reflects on long-term feedback effects of the 10 De Witte 2000, 4 [emphasis in original]. tension between the EU's internal non-discrimination position with regard to minority protection and the domestic norm construction in applicant countries, which follows from the EU's external policy of conditionality in combination with domestic factors and norm resonance, and tries to envisage possible backlashes on the EU.
Case and Argument
So far, research on norms in international relations has mainly focused on 'robust,' ie strong and stable, norms in order to account for the diffusion of and compliance with international norms.
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Work inspired by sociological institutionalism, with its stress on institutional isomorphism, deep internalisation and habitualisation, has specifically sought to make the case for a rule-following 'logic of appropriateness,' 12 which relies on stable norms to explain behaviour. 13 More recent constructivist approaches, which claim to 'bring agency back in' against the overly structuralist sociological institutionalist account, have done so mostly by studying agency in reaction to well established norms. 14 While others do acknowledge contestation as a central feature of norms, they stress the contestation between norm types (rather than norm meanings), treating them as basic, atomistic and unproblematic units of analysis. Research has thus focused on the question of 'which norms matter?' 15 with a view to understanding the power of particular norm types, thereby leaving to one side the contested meaning of norms. Such a structural analytic perspective on norms neglects the role of practices within particular normative contexts. The variation in normative context and hence the increasing probability of norm contestation does, 11 Legro 1997; Chayes and Chayes 1993; Jacobson 1996; Jepperson et al. 1996; Koh 1997; Sikkink 1993 . 12 March and Olsen 1989; 1998. 13 DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Finnemore 1996b; Kyvelidis 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; Berkovitch 1999 . 14 Checkel 1998. 15 See Legro 1997. however, require particular attention in transnational orders such as the EU, all the more so under conditions of enlargement. Before we turn to three case studies on contested meanings, the following section offers a theoretic discussion of neo-institutional and constructivist perspective on the construction, evolution and impact of norms.
Norm Resonance
This paper conceptualises norm development in terms of historical institutionalism, which stresses that different historical and cultural developments lead to cross-national variation and unintended consequences of institution building, due to path dependencies and the resulting fact that ' [t] he common imposition of a set of rules will lead to widely divergent outcomes in societies with different institutional arrangements.' 16 This insight becomes even more relevant, once we acknowledge that norm development takes place not only in different national settings, but also on the regional and global level, thus creating multiple path-dependencies and a need for the translation or mediation of meaning when norms are transferred from one level to another.
This brings the issue of norm resonance to the fore: new norms have to be modelled so as to 'resonate with pre-existing collective identities embedded in political institutions and cultures in order to constitute a legitimate political discourse.' 17 As a starting point, this is mostly presented as an argument about 'cultural match' and institutional 'goodness of fit,' on the one hand, 18 and the social embeddedness of formal institutions, on the other.
19 16 North 1990, 101; Pierson 1996; Thelen and Steinmo 1992. 17 Marcussen et al. 1999, 615; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 908. 18 Bulmer and Burch 2001. 19 Wiener 1998. Contrary to the rationalist point of view, where a 'misfit' between domestic and international norms creates the adaptational pressure necessary to provoke domestic change, 20 historical institutionalists and social constructivists maintain that only when new norms can be related to established institutions, traditions and beliefs, does norm transfer become possible. In this view, resonance is a structural precondition for enabling effective norm diffusion, which delineates the extent to which a norm may be accommodated within the new context. However, since complex normative structures consist of sometimes competing or even contradictory norms and broad principles in need of interpretation, they cannot determine a unique outcome in a structuralist fashion but merely provide 'resonance points' to which a new norm can be related, 21 so that 'norms create permissive conditions for action but do not determine action.'
22
Although an institutional analysis looking for 'resonance points' within the constitutive normative framework into which a norm is to be introduced is a starting point for assessing the range of possible resonant norms or norm interpretations, resonance is not simply 'out there' as a structural property of the norms themselves and therefore as an independent measure of norm robustness. It also includes an agency-oriented, dynamic and interactive element, insofar as 'the meanings of any particular norm and the linkages between existing norms and emergent norms are often not obvious and must be actively constructed by proponents of new norms.'
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Resonance therefore also entails an ability to create compelling and coherent arguments within a social context with regard to the norm and to relate the norm positively to institutions, traditions, and ideas that are prevalent to that context. In other words, one important question regarding 20 Börzel and Risse 2000. 21 Schwellnus 2001. 22 Finnemore 1996a, 158. 23 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 908. norm transfer from the international to the national level is how international norms are introduced into the process of domestic norm construction.
To explain the emergence of new norms as well as the transposition of international norms into domestic contexts, scholars have begun to study the actions of 'norm entrepreneurs,' ie agents actively promoting the norm. First, international organisations themselves can act as 'teachers of norms.' 24 To account for the role of international organisations in persuading national élites, some scholars are studying meetings between representatives of both sides. Once persuaded, the national representatives then become norm entrepreneurs in the domestic arena, assuming they are not themselves in a position to implement the norms directly. Second, following a 'bottomup' process of societal pressure and mobilisation, norm entrepreneurs can act as 'advocacy coalition networks' within the applicant states, mobilising public support against a reluctant government either out of principled commitment or for instrumental reasons.
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A third possible factor is the involvement of domestic or transnational experts acting as 'epistemic communities' 26 which promote EU rules internally as a model for domestic legislation. While work on epistemic communities has so far focused mainly on scientific expertise in highly technical policy areas, the concept has recently also been extended to lawyer communities. 27 Rather than mobilising against norm-breaching governments, political élites voluntarily include specialists in the domestic process of norm construction, since they can provide expertise and consensual interpretations sufficient to overcome the uncertainty that inheres in the absence of clear obligations and models. The influence of epistemic communities thus depends on favourable domestic conditions: a demand by political élites for expertise is a 24 Sikkink 1993. 25 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995. 26 Adler and Haas 1992. 27 Van Waarden and Drahos 2002. precondition for inclusion of experts in the process. Still, from the perspective of norm resonance, transnational communities of legal specialists are in a position, given their knowledge of both international and domestic norms, to perform an important function as catalysts or mediators of meaning.
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Non-discrimination and minority rights: EU rules and conditionality
For purposes of this paper, non-discrimination and special minority rights shall be treated as two distinct norms used to achieve the protection of minorities. 29 While the norms not necessarily contradict each other and can be combined in a comprehensive approach to minority protection, 30 they can still be distinguished and follow different rationales: First, non-discrimination is a general human rights principle (so that "belonging to a national minority" is only one among many reasons for discrimination to be eliminated), whereas special minority rights are groupspecific, ie targeted at particular persons or groups. A related issue is that non-discrimination as a general human right is applicable to all persons, while special minority rights can be restricted to citizens. Although the definition of minorities is in fact highly contested, 31 they are predominantly meant to protect long-term resident 'old' or 'national' minorities rather than the 'new' minorities created by migration and therefore restricted to citizens. Prevention of discrimination is the prevention of any action which denies to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish. 2. Protection of minorities is the protection of non-dominant groups which, while wishing in general for equality of treatment with the majority, wish for a measure of differential treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics which they possess and which distinguish them from the majority of the population. The protection belongs equally to individuals belonging to such groups'. UN Doc. E/CN.4/52 Section V. 30 Open Society Institute 2001a, 16. 31 Hofmann 1992. 32 This applies specifically to the context of European minority norms (Thiele 1999) . The UN, on the other hand, has come to include non-citizens in their minority-definition (Eide 1999) .
Secondly, while non-discrimination aims at the removal of all obstacles to the enjoyment of equal rights and full integration of persons belonging to minorities into society, special minority protectionrequires permanent positive state action in support of the minority group, in order to preserve its identity and prevent assimilation. 33 Minority protection is therefore a positive, nondiscrimination predominantly a negative right, although it can be interpreted in a way that allows at least temporarily for positive measures to counter de facto inequalities. 34 Thirdly, nondiscrimination is mostly viewed as an individual human right. By contrast, the question whether special minority rights should be conceptualised as individual or collective rights, ie as rights granted to persons belonging to minorities or rights granted to the groups as such in the form of self-government, autonomy or self-determination, remains highly contested. Hence, while the interpretation of the non-discrimination principle may vary between a formal and a substantive reading, depending on whether 'affirmative action' is allowed or not, special minority rights can conceptually be subdivided in individual and collective minority protection concepts.
35 33 Niewerth 1996 . 34 Thornberry 1991, 126 . Still, the aims of non-discrimination and minority protection remain different: positive measures under non-discrimination are by definition only to be employed temporarily and are put into place to remove the underlying distinction, while special minority rights are essentially permanent and aim at the preservation of the distinctive character of the minority group. 35 For an overview on collective minority protection cf. Human Rights (ECHR), which includes national minorities in a general non-discrimination clause. 49 Non-discrimination is also part of EU conditionality, although there is variation with regard to its strength across different Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). On the one hand, since all applicant countries are subject to a general requirement of complete adoption of the acquis, they all have a general obligation to develop non-discrimination legislation and specifically to implement the Race Equality Directive. On the other hand, Commission reports make explicit and constant reference to discrimination against Roma, particularly in the accession countries, where their situation is especially problematic. Hence, we can distinguish between general but rather weak and implicit conditionality for all applicants, on the one hand, and strong and explicit conditionality in 'problematic' cases, on the other. 46 Open Society Institute 2001a, 22. 47 ICCPR art 26: 'All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status'. UN GA Res 2200A (XXI 
EU rules and conditionality in the field of minority protection
In sharp contrast to the principle of non-discrimination, the EU has neither developed a minority rights standard within the internal acquis communautaire, nor do the member states subscribe to a single European standard. 50 In the accession acquis, the minority criterion also remained ill- Thornberry 1991, 412 ff) and the explicit denial of any association of minority protection with the two collective rights codified at the UN level, the prevention of genocide and the right of peoples to self-determination. In the preparations of the UN Convention on Genocide, the notion of 'cultural genocide' was discussed but rejected, not least because it was seen to reintroduce collective minority rights under another term (ibid, 72f). And in his comments, the UN Special Rapporteur Eide has always denied any connection between minority protection and national self-determination (Eide 1993; and therefore rejected the extension of the principle to include 'internal self-determination', ie autonomy, which has been developed by scholars working on minority rights (Heintze 1999, 625 While Recommendation 1201 was rejected as an additional protocol to the ECHR precisely because it includes collective minority provisions in the form of territorial autonomy, the individualist approach taken by the Framework Convention seems to codify the highest achievable standard beyond non-discrimination shared by at least the majority of European countries. 58 In any case, the EU's external promotion of collective minority rights declined during the accession process. 59 Not only was it increasingly clear that collective minority rights the other members of the group', although this adds an acknowledgement of a certain collective element to the article (Niewerth 1996 with the minority criterion in general, but do not seem to be subject to any particular minority protection disciplines.
Compliance with EU conditionality in applicant countries: Romania,
Hungary, and Poland
The following section surveys the implementation of non-discrimination and special minority rights legislation in three applicant countries, with a view to determining whether and to what extent the EU's policy of conditionality has led to formal legislation in the candidate countries in line with either the acquis or with particularised rules demanded by EU accession criteria. 61 The case selection reflects variation in both EU rules and EU conditionality or rule promotion. As Hughes and Sasse 2003. 61 By focusing exclusively on legislative measures, it follows a purely formal conception of rule adoption, being fully aware that this is not to be equated with de facto implementation or social acceptance, for which social in addition to legal internalisation would be needed (see Koh 1997) . It also does not mean that the situation of minorities is fundamentally better in states with adopted minority legislation than in those without.
for the selection of EU norms, as developed in the previous part, non-discrimination is considered a strong and clear EU rule, while minority rights are neither established nor uncontested at the EU level. The country cases are then selected according to variation in the strength and determinacy of EU conditionality: Romania has been under explicit and persistent pressure to implement both special minority rights and measures to counter Roma discrimination; Hungary is a mixed case, in which only the Roma issue was addressed, while the minority protection standard was considered sufficient and even exemplary; Poland is a case, where conditionality has been low in both areas. Hungarian minority, on the other, leading to a 'permanent tension between the expectations of the historical minorities regarding a protection based on group rights, and the fears of the Romanian governments that far reaching minority rights and autonomy would constitute the prelude to secession.' 65 Given these conflictive domestic conditions, the positive developments achieved since the mid-90s are best explained by the strong and persistent promotion of minority protection by international organisations. Furthermore, the EU also explicitly linked improvements in minority protection to the prospect of Romanian membership. However, the most profound improvement only occurred after the 1996 elections, when the former government, which depended heavily on nationalist forces, was replaced with a democratic and emphatically pro-Western coalition including the Hungarian party.
There were, moreover, limitations to the effectiveness of EU conditionality, which are related to the contested character of the minority rights norm and its resonance within the domestic context. This is most obvious in the failure of international pressure and conditionality to overcome strong domestic resistance and produce a collective minority standard. Although Romania accepted Recommendation 1201, first in relation to its accession to the Council of Europe, 66 and then in a bilateral treaty with Hungary (which was signed under international 63 Art 1/1 and 4/1 of the Romanian Constitution of 21 November 1991. 64 Accordingly, the 1991 constitution does not include collective minority provisions, despite initial promises of the new post-1989 government to 'guarantee individual and collective rights and freedoms for ethnic minorities'. (Shafir 2000, 102; cf. Tontsch 1995, 148) . It entails, however, positive individual clauses, a fact that was justified with reference to the lack of international standards regarding collective minority rights (Tontsch 1999, 237) . On the other hand, art 6/2 of the constitution states that 'protecting measures taken by the Romanian State for the preservation, development, and expression of identity of the persons belonging to national minorities shall conform to the principles of equality and non-discrimination in relation to the other Romanian citizens', which can be read as a prohibition of 'affirmative action'. Cf. Gabanyi 1998, 216; Tontsch 1999, 236 . 65 Tontsch 1999, 235 [translation from German -GS]. 66 Ram 2001, 72. pressure and EU conditionality), it rejected the notion of collective rights and autonomy included in the document by insisting that an additional footnote be added to the treaty. This reinterpretation was criticised by the Western organisations and by Hungary, as well as by the Hungarian minorities themselves. It could be justified, however, on the basis of the existing European standard, as represented by the Framework Convention, and it was finally accepted.
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In the following years, EU attention shifted from the issue of special minority rights to the issue of discrimination, especially with regard to Romania's Roma population. The European Commission report of 2000 concluded that 'the treatment of minorities in Romania is mixed.
The lack of progress with regard to tackling discrimination against the Roma is a subject which has been raised in previous regular reports but which has still not been adequately addressed. On the other hand, a series of progressive initiatives has greatly improved the treatment of other minorities.' 68 Thus, the EU explicitly spelled out non-discrimination as a missing element in the In sum, both minority protection and non-discrimination legislation in Romania seem to have been in large part triggered by external conditionality and rule promotion, especially by the EU.
However, externally driven rule adoption was limited to minority protection concepts that resonated with Romanian institutions ensuring that 'the treatment of individuals rather than groups as the subject of minority rights legislation has been fairly consistent over the past decade'. 71 This individualist preoccupation could not even be overcome by a combination of minority mobilisation, kin-state support, and EU conditionality.
Case 2: Hungary
With regard to minority protection, Hungary can hardly be viewed as an instance of EU conditionality or Western norm transfer in any meaningful sense. Not only was the legal system, guaranteed by the constitution and specified in the Minority Act of 1993, well developed by the time the minority criterion in the EU accession acquis was formulated, but Hungary has long been a promoter of minority rights; it was in fact among the main forces seeking to put minority protection on the international agenda after 1989. On the other hand, Hungary failed in its attempts to 'upload' the internally developed collective minority protection standard onto the international level, given the predominantly liberal-individualist character of the current European and global human rights norms, as well as the strong opposition to collective minority rights among some Western European countries. can therefore be concluded that the low adaptational pressure on Poland in the area of nondiscrimination has contributed to the neglect of the issue in Polish domestic legislation, the robustness and clarity of the norm in the EU context notwithstanding.
A similar outcome might therefore be expected in the area of minority rights. At first sight, this conclusion is supported by the fact that after external pressures -especially coming from Germany -were responded to through bilateral treaties, 83 and some legislative measures concerning preferential representation and education for minorities were introduced, the development of comprehensive minority legislation was (and still is) slow and contested. This outcome, while obviously not a result of external pressure, can also not be accounted for by a purely domestic explanation, for no clear national preference for a specific minority protection model can be deduced either from the minority situation or from national institutions or legacies. 87 Furthermore, far from having an established view on the issue, Polish political élites faced a high degree of uncertainty as to the form of protection to be implemented when the minority problem was 're-discovered' in 1989, since they where rather taken by surprise by the mobilisation of minorities that were believed to be marginal or even non-existent. 88 On the other hand, the minorities themselves-in contrast to their Hungarian counterparts -had no clear idea as to the minority protection concept they preferred.
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Absent sufficiently clearly defined internal or external determining factors, a closer look at the process of domestic norm construction and an inclusion of discursive (as opposed to formal institutional) factors of rule adoption is therefore required, if we are to explain the congruence between the emerging Polish minority standard and European norms. The following section elaborates in greater detail on the exceptional Polish case.
almost non-existent criticism in the Polish case, the 2000 report simply stated that 'Poland has ratified the major Human Rights conventions with the exception of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention on the protection of National Minorities (...) and has an established track record of providing appropriate international and constitutional legal safeguards for human rights and protection of minorities'. 2000 Regular Report of the Commission on Poland's Progress towards Accession, 57. 86 Łodziński 1999, 1. 87 With a comparatively low amount of internal minorities (3-5%) and external minorities that do not necessarily benefit from international minority protection, because they are, eg in Germany, not recognised as minorities, no clear preference for or against collective minority rights can be deduced (Bartsch 1995) , and historical legacies also vary widely. 88 Łodziński 1999, 3. 89 Gawrich 2001, 255f.
Domestic norm construction and European standards: contested minority concepts in Poland
The first major advance in developing a Polish minority protection norm was the inclusion of a minority clause in a new constitution. To ensure the protection of national minorities, whose status was still defined by a rigid non-discrimination clause under the old communist constitution 90 which, taken at face value, prohibited any form of minority protection by the means of positive measures. 91 The drafts proposed in 1991 by constitutional committees of both chambers of the Polish parliament, the Sejm and the Senate, contained special minority clauses on the basis of collective formulations. 92 It therefore seems that the initial position in the debate over the minority clause to be included in a new Polish constitution was at least to some extent based on a collective understanding of minority rights. Moreover, the minority provisions (1) 'Citizens of the Republic of Poland, irrespective of nationality, race, or religion, shall enjoy equal rights in all fields of public, political, economic, social, and cultural life. Infringement of this principle by any direct or indirect privileges or restrictions of rights by reference to nationality, race, or religion shall be punishable.' http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/p101000_.html 91 Mohlek 1994 , 24. 92 Hofmann 1992 Kallas 1995, 179; Mohlek 1994, 26 and 62. 93 These were the proposals handed in by the liberal Democratic Union (UD) and on the part of President Wałęsa, which featured as the fundamental rights section a Charter of Rights and Freedoms elaborated by the Helsinki Committee, a Warsaw based human rights NGO. The drafts are repoduced in Chruściak 1997, I/75 and 267; Kallas 1995, 182; Mohlek 1994, 63. 94 Cf for the different drafts Chruściak 1997; Kallas 1995; Mohlek 1994. A third option resembling the 'positive individualist' approach taken by the Council of Europe's Framework Convention was developed within the Sejm committee on national and ethnic minorities. The committee initially based its work on the Senate draft. However, after consultation with legal advisors, it replaced the collective formulation with an individualised one. 95 This version was also adopted by a group of legal specialists set up to develop a unified document building on the different constitutional drafts, 96 and was subsequently adopted by the The individually formulated minority clause, with some minor changes, was included in the final version of the constitution adopted on 2 April 1997.
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It is widely recognised that the 'protection of minority rights prescribed by this article goes beyond general principles of equality and non-discrimination of citizens as embodied in the old (communist) Constitution of 1952', 102 and the achievement was praised in the Commission Opinion on Poland's accession. 103 Although the second paragraph reintroduces a collective formulation, leading some foreign scholars to conclude that the constitution protects minority rights in both individual and collective terms, 104 the dominant interpretation in Poland is that the new constitution upholds 'an individualised approach to the protection of minorities by using a phrase 'Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities', which is consistent with the currently existing international standards'.
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A parallel development can be observed in the drafting of a law on national minorities. The initial text, worked out by a group of specialists from the Helsinki Committee, a Warsaw-based but transnationally organised human rights NGO, followed an entirely individualist approach to minority rights. 106 In ensuing discussions within the Sejm Committee on National and Ethnic Polish -GS] . 109 This line of reasoning was already laid out in the presentation of the project: 'In Art 35/2 of the Constitution the rights of minorities are mentioned. The Framework Convention on National Minorities also speaks about national minorities. (...) [B] ut this in no way changes the fact that (…) no group rights emerge from this law.' Jacek Kuroń (UW) in Sejm III kadencja, 46 posedzienie, (18 March 1999) [Sejm, term III, session 46 (18 March 1999) process of norm formulation, the involvement of these legal specialists produced a shift towards an individualised approach. Finally, although the question of EU conditionality was occasionally raised during the debates, 114 it did not play a major role in domestic norm construction and functioned rather as background knowledge about the general importance of minority protection in the accession procedure. But given the lack of a coherent EU model for minority protection and the absence of a high adaptational pressure to adopt specific model, the EU option could not play a decisive role in deciding which approach to minority protection should be chosen.
Therefore, the standards formulated by the Council of Europe above all had a major impact on the development of an intersubjective meaning among Polish politicians in favour of a minority norm consistent with European standards.
Conclusion: Long-term effects and backlash on the EU
The previous sections elaborated on the different impact exerted by norm types, such as eg human rights and minority rights, on the one hand, and norm meanings, such as general nondiscrimination and individual or collective forms of special minority rights, on the other. It can be argued that, if the analytical focus is limited to distinguish different norm types, and processes of contestation over norm meanings are excluded, this is likely to create unintended consequences for rights politics. To sustain this observation empirically, we have reconstructed the emergence of contested norm meanings regarding minority protection in the process of EU enlargement, focusing on the construction of meaning through interactions within international, an ongoing process. That is to say, it is not limited to the construction of international and
European norms prior to their respective application in the EU's policy of conditionality or to the process of compliance and domestic rule adoption on the part of the applicant states during the conditionality phase. The story does not end once the accession conditions are fulfilled, or at the moment of full membership. Instead, it is expected that the contestation of minority rights implies unintended long-term effects in the accession countries, as well as potential backlash against the EU after accession.
This concluding section offers an -albeit speculative -account of this possible backlash. A first set of effects concerns the feedback of external minority policies into the internal EU system. It can be concluded that such an influence has already taken place insofar as minority rights have been clearly and persistently placed on the agenda of EU politics, internally as well as externally.
However, while the end of the Cold War clearly constituted a critical juncture with regard to general concern over minorities within the international context, the impact of this juncture remains limited to the EU's external policies. Internally, it triggered a development within the existing path of non-discrimination, leading to a gap between the conceptual approaches to minority protection taken in both contexts. In turn, this paper claims that the non-discrimination track pursued in the internal EU context, on the one hand, and the domestic minority protection norms developed by the accession states under influence of the EU's external policy of conditionality, on the other, follow path dependent developments, and, once institutionalised, the gap is not easily closed. Indeed, our research suggests that it is likely to provoke enduring contestation about the meaning of minority rights, and stands to cause, albeit, unintended, yet long-term consequences. These effects will become particularly salient once the accession procedure is complete and the accession states are full members of the EU.
Secondly, it is important to address the issue of whether, and if so how, changes in the internal acquis communautaire had an impact on the external and enlargement policies, leading to a realignment of both tracks. For example, the EU increasingly linked its justifications for the minority criterion with the resonance points developing in the internal acquis, namely non- the EU has significant internal as well as external policy competence.' 120 In addition, the focus increasingly shifted from national minorities -especially the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia -to the situation of the Roma and therefore from (collective) minority protection to issues of non-discrimination. While this is largely due to the Roma issue becoming part of the EU's 'security agenda,' with the increase of Roma migration from applicant to EU member states, it can nonetheless facilitate attempts to develop a 'coherent' approach towards minority issues. It remains to be seen whether this is a largely rhetorical strategy to fend off claims of double standards, or in turn leads to the institutionalisation of minority rights within the boundaries of Article 6 TEU as the prime human rights foundation of the Union.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, long-term effects on the minority protection systems in the accession countries may be expected after accession is completed. The liberalising thrust of the ECJ rulings towards the inclusion of non-national and non-resident EU citizens is paralleled by the inclusive application of Article 13 and the non-discrimination Directives, which are applicable to all persons even including third country nationals. This fact points towards a potential tension with the minority systems established in the CEECs when measured by European standards and EU conditionality.
Perhaps the most striking example of the 'conceptual double standard' paradox lingering over the enlargement process is that the EU's external minority policy explicitly endorses the European minority protection standard of both the Council of Europe and the OSCE. That is, it accepts a standard which includes or, at least tolerates a restriction to citizens that the UN standard does not. In turn, national legislation based on this principle stands to be undermined by Community law once the CEECs have joined the EU. While this is not necessarily a legal 123 Streinz 1996 , 28. 124 Case C-274/96 Bickel/Franz [1998 ECR I-7637, para. 29. In this case, the court saw no undermining effects when the right in question -that a trial against a German speaker is to be held in German language upon requestwas also granted to other German-speaking EU nationals and therefore ruled against the Italian government, which had argued that the measures were designed to protect the German minority and for that reason only to be applied to problem, and might indeed even strengthen rather than weaken the minority protection system (as the ECJ argued in the Bickel/Franz case), the potential political reverberations in the CEECs, where the domestic consensus on minority protection is often fragile, could have strong negative consequences, since it could affect the willingness of national authorities to grant or uphold farreaching rights to minorities, when the minority can be enlarged, so to speak, by migration.
